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What future for the EU after Brexit? 
Paul De Grauwe 
 
How should the European Union react to the decision of the British people to 
withdraw from the union? This is the question that is at the center of the political 
debate in Europe since Brexit became a reality. I will first discuss the question of 
the nature of the reforms that are called for as a result of Brexit. I will then turn 
to the issue of the negotiating strategy the EU should adopt towards the UK.    
The starting point in trying to answer the question of how the EU should be 
reformed is the observation that the European Union has a very negative image 
today, not only in the UK but also in other parts of the EU. According to many 
analysts, this has to do with a democratic deficit of the EU. 
There is certainly a lack of democracy in the decision-making at the European 
level. But is the democratic deficit at the EU level worse than at the national 
level? Legislation in the European Union is made by the Council of Ministers and 
the European Parliament. The ministers are sent by their national governments. 
And the latter have come about as a result of democratic elections in each 
country. MEPs are elected directly. Thus the decision-making bodies in the 
European Union have the same democratic legitimacy as national governments 
and parliaments. If there is a democratic deficit it is the same at the national and 
European levels, and both national and European institutions should be 
questioned and reformed. 
I see a deeper cause of the dissatisfaction with the European Union. I will argue 
that this dissatisfaction has to do with the inability of the European Union to set 
up a mechanism that protects the losers of globalization. Worse, the EU has 
reduced the capacity of national governments to take on the role of protector, 
while nothing has been done to create such a mechanism at the EU-level. 
Free trade creates an incredible dynamic of innovation and material prosperity. 
That prosperity, however, does not benefit everyone. Many are better off thanks 
to globalization. But many others are not. Some even see their welfare decline 
because they lose their jobs or because their incomes fall. 
As globalization creates material welfare in the countries that participate in it, it 
is in principle possible to compensate the losers from globalization. That is the 
argument that most economists find strong enough to defend globalization. But 
the political obstacles towards organizing redistribution towards the losers of 
globalization are large. This is a problem in most industrialized countries, but it 
is made even more intense in the EU.  
The European institutions have become major promoters of globalization. The 
single market and the trade agreements reached by the European Commission 
have widely opened up the European gates to globalization. There is nothing 
wrong with that per se. Except that there is a complete failure to organize the 
necessary compensation towards the losers of the globalization. The European 
institutions have no power over social policy, which has been kept in the hands 
of the national authorities. However, the hands of these authorities have been 
shackled by the same European institutions’ fiscal rules.  
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The European fiscal rules not only make it extremely difficult to compensate the 
losers from globalization. What is worse, they have amplified the hardship of the 
losers from globalization. Since at least five years the European Commission has 
pushed all member-countries of the Eurozone into an austerity straightjacket 
that has produced economic stagnation and rising unemployment mainly of 
those who had already been hit badly by globalization. It will be no surprise that 
many turn their backs towards the European institutions that are seen as cold 
and ready to punish when millions live in hardship.  
Not only the fiscal rules but also the structural reforms that have been imposed 
by the same European institutions are to blame for the rejection of the European 
Union by millions of people.  European policy makers have adopted the neo-
liberal discourse. According to this discourse, workers must be flexible (read: 
they should be happy when their wages fall, when they can be dismissed quickly 
and when they receive less unemployment benefits). The neo-liberal 
policymakers that now dominate the European Union preach that social security 
is unproductive and should be downsized. These policies are euphemistically 
called structural reforms. They are imposed on millions of people, mostly the 
losers of globalization, by European institutions and national governments alike.  
The problem of the European Union today is that, instead of helping those who 
suffer from globalization, it has set up policies that hurt these people even more. 
It is no surprise that the losers revolt. If the EU continues with austerity and 
structural reforms, revolt will spread and will take the form of attempts to exit 
the Union. It is time the European Union takes the side of the losers of 
globalization instead of pushing for policies that mainly benefit the winners.  
This can be done in two ways. The first one is to stop imposing structural 
reforms on the member-states. The rationale for these structural reforms has 
been that they promote economic growth and therefore should benefit 
everybody. The empirical evidence of a positive link between structural reforms 
and economic growth, however, is very weak. In a recent econometric analysis of 
the OECD countries we could not find evidence that reforms in the labour 
markets and in the product markets boost economic growth (De Grauwe and 
Ji(2015)). This is also confirmed by a recent study of the IMF(2015). We do find, 
however, that investment, both private and public, has a strong positive effect on 
economic growth.  
The latter result points the way to the second change in economic policies that 
the European policymakers should initiate. This should consist in boosting public 
investment. The latter have suffered severe collateral damage from the ill-
conceived austerity programs imposed by the European institutions.  
A boost in public investment can only be achieved by changing the fiscal compact 
that imposes structural budget balance in the member-states of the Eurozone. 
This compact has the unfortunate implication that public investment can only be 
financed by current revenues. A more destructive rule for economic growth has 
rarely been imposed.  When politicians are told that the cost of public investment 
should be fully borne by present taxpayers (voters) while the benefits will accrue 
to future taxpayers (voters) it will not surprise that the political incentives to 
engage in public investment will be weak. This is what happens today. Thanks to 
a stupid rule, public investment in the Eurozone is at a historic low level.  
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It is often said that allowing public debt to increase will saddle our children with 
an unbearable debt burden. This criticism confuses gross and net debt. When 
productive public investments are undertaken by issuing government bonds, our 
children will inherit both productive assets and government bonds. Today the 
cost of issuing government bonds is close to zero in many Eurozone countries. If 
governments manage to invest in productive assets that have a return higher 
than zero, our children will inherit assets that create revenues exceeding the cost 
of borrowing. They will not understand why we have not done so when 
borrowing was so cheap. 
I am a proponent of more political integration in Europe. But today grand 
schemes for “more Europe” should be put on the back burner. As long as 
European politicians continue to follow ill-conceived economic policies one 
cannot ask people to follow them in constructions for more of the same.   
What should be the negotiating strategy the EU should adopt towards the United 
Kingdom since that country has decided for Brexit?  
Here is the choice that must be presented to the UK. Either the UK government 
takes over (a close version of) the Norwegian model or it stands alone and 
negotiates new trade agreements with the EU and about fifty other countries (or 
group of countries) in the framework of the rules of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO). The EU must make it clear that there is nothing between 
these two choices. There can be no "special deal" with the United Kingdom in the 
sense of trading off some migration versus market access. 
If the UK accepts the Norwegian model, it retains full access to the single market. 
In that case there are no obstacles for British goods and services in the EU and 
for EU goods and services in the UK. But, as is well known, the price the UK pays 
in this model is the free movement of EU citizens in and out of the UK. Without 
the free movement of people there can be no free movement of services. This is 
the core of the single market. Moreover, the Brits will have to accept two other 
things in the Norwegian model.  First, they will have to abide by the rules on 
standards, health and safety that are decided in Brussels without being involved 
in the decision making process. Secondly, they will have to contribute to the 
European budget. 
Although, the acceptance of this model would probably be in the best interest of 
both the UK and the EU, it is very unlikely that the UK government will accept it. 
The Brexit camp considers free migration and Brussels legislation as diabolic and 
will revolt if the UK government accepts these conditions. True there is an 
important faction in the new government that is attached to maintaining full 
access to the single market and sees few problems in accepting free movement of 
people and Brussels regulation. But this faction is probably too weak to counter 
the demands of  the hard Brexit supporters. 
I assume, therefore, that the British government will reject the Norwegian model 
and will try to obtain concessions from the EU that reduce migration flows, while 
ensuring access to the single market. Here, the EU must make it clear that a 
special deal with the UK, allowing such cherry picking, is excluded. The EU must 
insist that the only other option for the UK is to stand on its own feet, and to start 
negotiating new trade deals with the EU and other countries in the framework of 
the WTO-rules, after Brexit is completed. In other words, the UK must be treated 
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like the US, China, Brazil, etc., i.e. as sovereign nations that insist on maintaining 
full sovereignty over their trade agreements. The trade negotiations between the 
UK and the rest will take years, if not decades. Their outcome is uncertain. It is 
not clear, for example whether the UK will be able to maintain free movement of 
services with the EU as this freedom is intimately linked to the free movement of 
people. But that is a problem for the Brits who have chosen to embrace full 
sovereignty. 
Here are the reasons why the EU should not accept to be dragged down in 
negotiating a special cherry-picking deal with the UK. Some EU-countries are 
tempted today to also organize referenda. I have no problem in principle against 
such referenda. If citizens of a country dislike being member of a club, they 
should be able to leave. This will be better for all. There is no point in living 
together with people who intensely dislike each other. However, it is in the 
interest of both parties that the terms of the divorce should be made clear in 
advance.  
That is why the EU should make it clear what potential exiters should expect. It 
will be either (some close version of) the Norwegian model or a “standalone-
model” in which the newly sovereign nations will face the difficult task of 
establishing new trade agreements in the framework of the WTO-rules. Clarity is 
essential for those who consider leaving the EU. This clarity can only be achieved 
by excluding a privileged trade agreement with the United Kingdom. 
When the UK joined the EU in 1973 its main strategy was to prevent the union 
from becoming too strong. The UK political elite decided that this could best be 
achieved from inside the union. Now that the UK is departing the century old 
British strategy remains the same, i.e. to weaken the forces that can make Europe 
stronger. The UK can achieve this by insisting on a special deal with the EU 
whereby it maintains the benefits of the union while not sharing in the costs. 
Such a deal, if it comes about, will signal to other member countries that by 
exiting they can continue to enjoy the benefits of the union without the costs. 
Such a prospect would fatally weaken the European Union. 
